In this paper, we present a method for the characterization of Markov perfect Nash equilibria being Pareto efficient in non-linear differential games. For that purpose, we use a new method for computing Nash equilibria with Markov strategies by means of a system of quasilinear partial differential equations. We apply the necessary and sufficient conditions derived to characterize efficient Markov perfect Nash equilibria to dynamic fishery games.
Introduction
The interdependence between the decisions of the agents is well known in many areas of economics. Game theory is a useful tool to study these situations involving several decision makers. An interesting question is to determine whether the non cooperative solution presents the property of Pareto efficiency. The question is whether a cooperative behavior can emerge without any binding agreements between the agents. The efficiency of Nash equilibrium is a very uncommon feature, but at the same time a very desirable property, since it makes the efficient solution selfenforcing. If, moreover, the Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect, the efficient solution can be enforced for any initial condition during the course of the game.
If a priori efficiency is not at hand, a standard method to implement cooperative solutions by means of non-cooperative play is to construct efficient Markov perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE) based on trigger strategies, as in Haurie and Pohjola (1987) or Tolwinski et al. (1986) . Within the limits of differential games theory, this approach presents technical problems because trigger strategies are in general discontinuous and needs the introduction of memory strategies for the players. These strategies are based on all past information of the game evolution to the current time, and as a consequence, this kind of strategies are non-Markovian. Another option is the use of incentive strategies, establishing the efficient solution as an incentive equilibrium (see, for example, Ha¨ma¨la¨inen, 1989, 1993; Jørgensen and Zaccour, 2001) .
It is important to note that the attainment of the cooperative solution as a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game will depend on what set of strategies is available to the players. For that reason, this paper proposes a new approach that allows to identify games where the MPNE based on Markov strategies is Pareto efficient. This new approach is based on the characterization of MPNE as solutions to a system of quasilinear partial differential equations. This system is obtained from the optimality conditions of the maximum principle. The quasilinear system is fully equivalent to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system, as pointed out in Rinco´n- Zapatero et al. (1998) . The former system characterizes MPNE directly, whereas the latter characterizes the value functions. However, a quasilinear system is much more amenable than a fully non-linear system of partial differential equations as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system.
To our knowledge, there are no necessary and sufficient conditions in the literature to be applied to general differential game models that allow to determine whether the feedback Nash equilibrium is or not a Pareto optimum. This paper is devoted to establish a method that allows us to identify the coefficient functions of a rather general differential game in order that the game possesses an efficient MPNE. A particular case, for differential games with unidimensional state and control variables and where each control is a smooth function of the state and time variable, has been studied in Rinco´n-Zapatero et al. (2000) . The importance of the identification of equilibria being Pareto optimum relies on the stability properties of Nash's concept and on the efficiency of the cooperative solution. An extreme case of this type of solutions are the so called absolutely cooperative, which are studied, e.g., in Leitmann (1974) .
It is well known that, in general, the use of Markov strategies in non-cooperative games prevents to attain efficient outcomes (see, for example, Dubey, 1986) . In fact, the efficiency of Nash equilibrium can be considered a very rare property. However, such a property has been noticed to hold for some fishery games Chiarella et al. (1984) . In this paper, the players are restricted to use open-loop strategies, so the Nash equilibrium is not subgame perfect. Our aim is to analyze whether the same property can be guaranteed when the players use Markov strategies. Our approach is based on a necessary condition established in Theorem 2, which constitutes an easily implementable test for checking if the efficiency of the MPNE is possible in a concrete differential game. Once we substitute the functional relationship in the coupled quasilinear system, we obtain an overdetermined system. The existence of solutions is then tested with a well-known compatibility condition developed in the theory of partial differential equations, as it is shown in Theorem 3. This is the content of our sufficiency result.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is devoted to state a differential game in general form and some of its cooperative and non-cooperative solutions. In particular, MPNE and Pareto optima for the non-cooperative and cooperative games, respectively. A brief presentation of the new characterization of Nash equilibrium as solution to a system of quasilinear partial differential equations is also included. A more detailed analysis of this approach can be found in Rinco´n-Zapatero et al. (1998) and Martı´n-Herra´n and Rinco´n-Zapatero (2002) . In Section 3, Theorem 2, we establish a necessary condition for the Pareto efficiency of MPNE. In Theorem 3, a set of sufficient conditions is given. In order that Nash equilibrium be a Pareto optimum, our approach uses a compatibility condition that makes the existence of common solutions of several partial differential equations possible. Let us observe that the compatibility condition is easier to be applied to a quasilinear partial differential equations system than to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system. The results are shown with three different economic differential games belonging to the class of dynamic fishery games in Section 4. Conclusions are presented in Section 5.
Description of the game: characterization of MPNE
In this section, we present the characteristics of the differential games considered along the paper, some definitions and the results we will use in the following sections. First we introduce some notation. A subscript indicates partial differentiation; the partial derivative of a scalar function with respect to a vector and the partial derivative of a vector function with respect to a scalar are defined as column vectors. Also, the partial derivative of a vector function with respect to another vector is defined as a matrix, e.g. h z ¼ @h=@z ¼ ð@h i =@z j Þ nÂm ; where h and z are n Â 1 and m Â 1 vectors, respectively. The superscript > denotes the transposition sign.
We consider an N-person differential game over a fixed and bounded time interval ½0; T: The formulation of the game for the infinite horizon case is quite similar, the only difference being that there is no bequest function for the players. Please see below for the definition of the bequest function. with initial condition yðtÞ ¼ x; t 2 ½0; T; x 2 R n ;
and where the pair ðt; xÞ is the root from which the dynamic game proceeds. Since our aim is to work with the MPNE concept, we need to consider the game for every root ðt; xÞ: U i R n denotes the control region of ith player.
Definition 1 (Admissible strategies). A strategic profile u ¼ ðu 1 ; . . . ; u N Þ is called admissible if uðsÞ 2 U 1 Â Á Á Á Â U N for every s 2 ½0; T and (i) for every ðt; xÞ the system (1) with initial condition yðtÞ ¼ x admits a unique solution; (ii) for each i ¼ 1; . . . ; N; there exists some function
Let U i denote the set of admissible strategies of player i and U ¼ U 1 Â Á Á Á Â U N the set of admissible strategy profiles. Notice that we are considering Markov controls for the players. If f i is time independent, the corresponding control is called a stationary Markov control. Sometimes we will identify u i and f i in the notation. The instantaneous utility function of player i is denoted by L i and his or her bequest function by S i : Given ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T Â R n and an admissible strategic profile u; the payoff functional of each player is given by 
with r i X0 the discount rate. The functions
are all assumed to be of class C 1 : J i ðt; x; uÞ denotes the utility obtained by player i when the games starts at ðt; xÞ and the profile of strategies is u.
In the infinite horizon case, which is important for us since the worked examples in the paper belong to this class of games, the bequest function is of course null. In this case, if the problem is autonomous and the strategies are Markov stationary, the value function is independent of time, and the initial condition is simply x, with t ¼ 0:
In a non-cooperative setting the aim of the players is to maximize their individual payoff J i : Since this aspiration depends on the strategies selected by the other players also, it is generally impossible to attain. An adequate concept of solution is Nash equilibrium, which prevents unilateral deviations of the players from its recommendation of play. deviating unilaterally from his or her Nash controls as long as the other players continue to use their Nash strategies. However, this solution can give inefficient outcomes. On the other hand, the players do not have incentives to play Pareto optima if they are not able to attain binding agreements.
The next result establishes that in order for a MPNE to be Pareto optimum it is necessary that no prisoners' dilemma occurs in the static game with payoff functions ðH 1 ; . . . ; H N Þ; for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T Â R n : However, this is only a necessary condition. The Pareto optimality of Nash strategies in the static Hamiltonian game does not prevent the non-efficiency of Nash equilibria. This was already noted in Starr and Ho (1969) .
Theorem 2. Let b f 2 U be a C 1 MPNE of the game (1) (3), interior to the control region and satisfying det j f u i ðt; x;fÞja0 for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T Â R n ; i 2 f1; . . . ; Ng: Let H i be of class C 2 with respect to u 2 U for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T Â R n ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; N: Assume that the following set of conditions hold:
for all i; j; k 2 f1; . . . ; Ng with i; kaj: If b f is Pareto optimum, then for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T Â R n there exists i 2 f1; . . . ; Ng such that for all j 2 f1; . . .
Proof. For i fixed let us suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist j 2 f1; . . . ; Ng; iaj; t 2 ½0; T and
Since H i is C 2 ; for every ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T Â R n we have for all u 2 U H i ðt; x; u;
with u i in the segment ½ b fðt; xÞ; uðt; xÞ: Furthermore, due to the subgame perfectness property of b f and the fact that it is interior to U i we have
for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T Â R n :
for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T Â R n : As a consequence of hypothesis (12), H i u j ðt;x; b f; G i Þa0 and obviously, this inequality holds in a neighborhood O of ðt; xÞ:
For e 2 R n with all components positive and sufficiently small, let us consider
for all k 2 f1; . . . ; Ng; where S denotes a n Â n diagonal matrix, Remark 4. The concavity of Hamiltonian H i with respect to variables ðu 1 ; . . . ; u N Þ implies that the necessary condition (11) for the ith player is also sufficient for Pareto efficiency of Nash equilibrium. This can be seen from the Taylor expansion (13), where the second order term is negative. In this case the MPNE is in fact the optimal profile that the ith player would choose in case he or she could manage all the control variables. Hence, the efficient MPNE would arise as the optimal control profile when the ith player has all the bargaining power in the cooperative game. If condition (11) is satisfied for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; N together with the supplementary hypothesis of concave Hamiltonians H i ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; N; with respect to all the control variables, for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T Â R n ; then the MPNE is an absolutely cooperative solution. Let us note that condition (11) is fulfilled for zero-sum games and team problems. Remark 6. The hypothesis (10) can be eliminated in the statement of Theorem 2 when a two-person game is considered. The two-person game with a unique state variable and one control variable for each player was studied in Rinco´n- Zapatero et al. (2000) .
Our purpose now is to establish sufficient conditions for Pareto efficiency of a MPNE. From now on, we concentrate on the two-person game with a unique state variable and one control variable for each player, but the following could be extended to a more general setting. We denote by u 2 ¼ jðt; x; u 1 Þ the necessary relation (11) between the strategies of the two players. By replacing this relation in system (4) that holds for a MPNE, we obtain an overdetermined system. We look for conditions ensuring the existence of solutions to this system. To this end, we introduce the following notation for the two partial differential equations that arise from (4) 
All functions are evaluated at ðt; x; u 1 ; jðt; x; u 1 ÞÞ and
We denote by ½F 1 ; F 2 the following sum of determinants
once we have replaced p; q by their expressions given by (17).
Theorem 3. Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied:
(C1) The pair ð b f 1 ; jÞ 2 U is a C 1 Markov Pareto optimum of problem (1)- (3), such that f u 1 ðt; x; b f 1 ; jÞa0 for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T Â R n :
jÞ satisfies the final condition required in (6) associated to problem (1)-(3). (C4) For all u 1 2 U 1 ; u 2 2 U 2 ; t 2 ½0; T; for every ðt; xÞ 2 ½0;
where
Then ð b f 1 ; jÞ is a MPNE.
Proof. When Da0; expression ½F 1 ; F 2 ¼ 0 is a compatibility condition that ensures the existence of some common solution to the two partial differential equations, Ames (1965) :
Since F i ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2 characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game and taking into account conditions (C3), and (C4), we can apply Theorem 1 and conclude that the pair ð b f; jÞ is a MPNE. & Remark 7. As we did in Remark 2, when an infinite horizon is considered, the final condition (C3) in Theorem 3 must be replaced by the sufficient transversality conditions (8) and (9).
Remark 8. When Da0 and the compatibility condition stated in Theorem 3 is not fulfilled, then the Pareto optimum cannot be a Nash equilibrium. In fact, ½F 1 ; F 2 ¼ 0 is a necessary condition for the efficiency of Nash equilibrium. This provides a negative criterion based on a full computational method. When D ¼ 0 and the equations F 1 0; F 2 0 are not such that one implies the other, then there is no common solution to the equations, hence again in this case the MPNE is not efficient.
Application to dynamic fishery games
In this section the necessary and sufficient conditions for the efficiency of a MPNE established in Theorem 2 and in Theorem 3 are applied to dynamic fishery games. First a very general model of fishing borrowed from Chiarella et al. (1984) is stated. Let us consider N countries that can access to m fish populations. The instantaneous utility of the ith country is
where x j is the jth fish population and c i ðc i1 ; . . . ; c im Þ is the extraction vector of the ith country, with c ij the extraction rate by the ith country for the jth fish population. The population dynamics are described by the differential equations
This specification includes predator-prey and other types of biological interaction. The payoff functional of each player is given as in (3). In Chiarella et al. (1984) four sets of conditions, under each of which there is an efficient Nash equilibrium path, are stated for some particular specifications of the fishery model described above. The solution concept used is open-loop. Although the efficiency of open-loop Nash equilibria for a class of fishery models is shown, by means of the necessary condition derived in Theorem 2 it can be proved that the Pareto optimal solution cannot be achieved as a MPNE. A similar result for a simple model of exploitation of a common-property non-renewable resource is stated in Dockner et al. (2000) . The authors show that the achievement of the cooperative solution as a Nash equilibrium depends on what set of strategies is available to the players. Let us consider that L i is a function of c i only. In Chiarella et al. (1984) it is proved that for this choice and independently of the population dynamics, there exists a Pareto-optimal open-loop Nash equilibrium. Then the MPNE is not Pareto optimal.
Proof. Applying the necessary condition (11) for the specification given and for the ith player we have From now on we center on two different statements of a two species fishery differential game and we try to identify the coefficient functions of the games such that these admit efficient MPNE. The first example is taken from Clemhout and Wan (1985) who studied an infinite horizon differential game in the setting of a prey-predator system. The second example is borrowed from Ha¨ma¨la¨inen et al. (1985) . These authors analyze a finite horizon differential game in the framework of fishery management and in particular of the exploitation of the so-called transboundary fisheries.
Example 1. We consider the following two-person two-species differential game where players harvest from two different fish populations. Let us assume the following system dynamics:
where x 1 and x 2 denote the stocks of the two species and c ij denotes the harvest rate of player i on species j: The payoff for the ith player is given by We have eliminated the time dependencies to shorten the notation. The differential game can be formulated as max c i1 ;c i2 fW i ðx 0 ; cÞ : s:t: ð18Þ ð19Þg;
In order to analyze the Pareto efficiency of MPNE we first focus our attention in the simplest specification: the two-person one-species differential game. The population dynamics for this game is
where x denotes the stock of the fish species and c i denotes the harvest rate of player i: The function g i ðx; cÞ for the ith player is
Since we have stated an infinite horizon game and the problem is autonomous, stationary strategies are considered. In order to test if there is some solution to system (21)- (22) we make use of the compatibility condition (C2). For this game, it appears as a third degree homogeneous polynomial in the variables x; c 1 ; namely,
There are only two possible sets of conditions on the parameters under which the polynomial is identically null, and then the compatibility condition ensures the existence of at least one common solution to system (21)-(22).
One-species game, I. 
Under these conditions equations (21)- (22) are proportional, then it is sufficient to find a solution for, for example, the first one. It could be proved that the linear solution given by 
In this case these equations are not proportional and we have to look for solutions satisfying both equations simultaneously. It is easy to prove that the following linear solution satisfies system (21)-(22)
As before, from condition (20) the corresponding harvest rate of the second player is
In both cases, it is straightforward to show that the established strategy makes the dynamics stable if b40:
The concavity of H i with respect to his or her own control variable is ensured and this property assures the fulfillment of condition (C4) in Theorem 3. Moreover, the Hamiltonians H 1 and H 2 are strictly concave with respect to all the control variables, which makes applicable Remark 4 guaranteeing that the necessary condition (11) is sufficient too and assuring the Pareto optimality of the pair ðc 1 ; ðw c 12 =w c 11 Þc 1 Þ: Consequently, all the conditions listed in Theorem 3 are fulfilled. Once we have characterized the efficient MPNE for the one-species game, summarized in Table 1 , we return to the original two-species specification. The necessary condition (11) for the ith player for this specification reads necessary condition (11) for this player is sufficient too, as we pointed out in Remark 4. Then, we have found a MPNE, given by the expressions (32) and (31), which qualifies as a Pareto optimum. Let us note that in this example, the efficient MPNE is not an absolute cooperative solution, since the necessary condition (11) is not fulfilled for the first player. In fact, for the symmetric game it has been proved that choosing linear renovation functions and looking for linear strategies there are no solutions satisfying the necessary conditions for both players simultaneously. When the renovation functions follow a logistic the same result applies if linear or quadratic strategies are considered.
Conclusions
We have derived necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize MPNE being Pareto efficient. The proposed method is based on the characterization of Markov Nash equilibria as solutions to a system of quasilinear partial differential equations. Our approach also uses a compatibility condition that makes it possible to verify the existence of common solutions of several partial differential equations. For differential games with unidimensional state and control variables, the nonfulfillment of this compatibility condition provides a negative criterium based on a full computational method, establishing that the Pareto optimum cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Even though the efficiency of Nash equilibria is not a common property, it is a very desirable property, since it makes the efficient solution self-enforcing. We have proved that there are interesting economic differential games, in particular, the dynamic fishery games, that present this property, although they are non-cooperative in its mode of play. We have also proved that it can be the case that the cooperative solution can be achieved as an open-loop Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game, but not as a MPNE.
